Dawes v. The People of the State of California

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM DAWES, Case No.: 24cv-0401-CAB (DTF) CDCR #G-43030, 12 ORDER DISMISSING SECOND Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 14 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 15 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) CALIFORNIA, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff William Dawes, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 21 filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a motion to 22 proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1-2. Plaintiff named as Defendants the People of 23 the State of California, the Governor of California, the California Attorney General, a 24 Deputy District Attorney, a Public Defender, four Judges, the San Diego Sheriff’s 25 Department, Patton State Hospital, and four psychiatrists. ECF No. 1 at 2-5. He claimed 26 they violated his federal constitutional rights in connection to his criminal trial and 27 competency determination in the San Diego County Superior Court and failed to protect 28 him from assault by inmates at the San Diego County Jail. Id. at 6-11. 1 On May 20, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and 2 screened his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b), which require 3 the court to sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is 4 frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 5 immune. ECF No. 6. The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims against the prosecutors, 6 judges and defense counsel in his criminal proceedings and competency determination 7 failed to state a claim because those Defendants were immune from relief with respect to 8 their involvement in those proceedings and because Plaintiff had failed to allege his 9 conviction has been declared invalid. Id. at 4-7. The Court dismissed the remaining claims 10 against the remaining Defendants as conclusory. Id. at 5, 7-8. Plaintiff was informed of 11 those pleading defects and granted leave to amend on or before July 5, 2024. Id. at 8-9. 12 On May 20, 2024, the same day the dismissal Order was filed, the Clerk of Court 13 docketed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 7. The First Amended Complaint 14 suffered from the same defects of pleading as the original Complaint because Plaintiff did 15 not have the benefit of this Court’s dismissal Order identifying and informing him of those 16 pleading defects. Accordingly, on May 21, 2024, the Court dismissed the First Amended 17 Complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) with leave to 18 amend for failure to state a claim for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s May 20, 19 2024, dismissal Order. ECF No. 8. 20 Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 9. 21 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 22 A. Standard of Review 23 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-Answer 24 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte 25 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails 26 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 27 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 28 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 1 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 2 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 3 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 4 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 5 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 6 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 7 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 8 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 9 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Determining whether 10 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 11 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 12 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 13 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 14 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 15 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 16 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quote 17 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 18 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 19 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 20 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 21 B. Claims Challenging Criminal Proceedings 22 Plaintiff alleges in the SAC, as he did in his original Complaint, that Defendants 23 California Governor Newsom and California Attorney General Bonta allowed Defendant 24 Deputy District Attorney Blaylock to criminally prosecute him, which involved 25 competency proceedings, without ensuring he received a fair trial. ECF No. 9 at 3-7, 8-17. 26 He alleges that Defendants Public Defender Jayakhymar, Judges Davis, Maguire, Parsky 27 and Church, and Defendants expert witness psychiatrists Dr. Badre, Dr. Boyde, Dr. 28 Naimark and Dr. Rao, participated in those unfair proceedings, allowed him to be declared 1 incompetent, permitted him to be forcibly medicated, and deprived him of his personal 2 property. Id. He alleges Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s Department allowed him to be 3 attacked at the San Diego Jail on May 17, 2019. Id. at 8. Plaintiff adds Defendant “Salinas 4 Valley State Prison Mailroom Employees,” and alleges they seized his property in May of 5 2024, after this action was filed, in retaliation for filing a lawsuit. Id. 6 As Plaintiff was informed in the Court’s prior dismissal Order, Defendants Judges 7 Davis, Maguire, Parsky and Church are immune from actions arising from the discharge 8 of their official duties as alleged by Plaintiff here. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 9 (1991) (“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment 10 of damages.”); Moore v. Urquhart, 899 F.3d 1094, 1104 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Section 1983 11 . . . provides judicial officers immunity from injunctive relief even when the common law 12 would not.”) Plaintiff was also informed that his claims against Defendants Attorney 13 General Bonta and Deputy District Attorney Blaylock with respect to his criminal and 14 competency proceedings are barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 15 Prosecutors are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from liability for damages 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the alleged wrongful acts were committed by a prosecutor 17 in the performance of an integral part of the criminal judicial process as alleged by Plaintiff 18 here. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976); Robichaud v. Ronan, 19 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965); Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 20 2001) (quasi-judicial immunity is available for attorneys general for conduct related to their 21 state litigation duties in civil suits). Plaintiff was also informed he failed to state a claim 22 against Defendant Public Defender Jayakhymar. “[A] public defender does not act under 23 color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a 24 defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); 25 Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[The public 26 defender] was, no doubt, paid by government funds and hired by a government agency. 27 Nevertheless, his function was to represent his client, not the interests of the state or 28 county.”); Garnier v. Clarke, 332 Fed. App’x 416 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s 1 sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s § 1983 claims against appointed counsel). Because it is 2 now clear Plaintiff is unable to state a claim against Defendants Bonta, Blaylock, 3 Jayakhymar, Davis, Maguire, Parsky and Church, they are sua sponte dismissed without 4 further leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for seeking relief 5 from defendants who are immune. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 6 Plaintiff was also previously informed that he is unable to state a claim under 42 7 U.S.C. § 1983 against any Defendant based on allegations he was wrongfully convicted 8 and sentenced, because such claims as alleged sound only in habeas. Claims related to the 9 “circumstances” of a prisoner’s confinement are brought in a civil rights action under 42 10 U.S.C. § 1983, while constitutional challenges to the validity or duration of a prisoner’s 11 confinement must be raised in a petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 12 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004), citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 13 500 (1973); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The 14 Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state 15 prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 16 1983 action.”), citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). A claim based on 17 “harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 18 invalid,” is not cognizable under § 1983 unless Plaintiff “prove[s] that the conviction or 19 sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid 20 by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 21 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Heck v. Humphrey, 22 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages based on claims that 23 he has been unlawfully convicted, sentenced, and/or incarcerated, he may not pursue those 24 claims in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without first showing his 25 conviction has been invalidated. Id.; see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th 26 Cir. 2003) (“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie 27 within ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state 28 prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but 1 not to the fact or length of his custody.’”), quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99 (holding 2 that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state 3 prisoner with the exclusive means to attack the validity of his confinement in federal court). 4 Because Plaintiff does not allege his conviction has been invalidated by way of direct 5 appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. 6 at 487, and it is now clear he is unable to do so, all claims against Defendants Newsom, 7 Bonta, Blaylock, Jayakhymar, Maguire, Parsky, Church, Dr. Badre, Dr. Boyde, Dr. 8 Naimark, Dr. Rao, Patton State Hospital and the People of the State of California are sua 9 sponte dismissed without further leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which 10 relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). 11 C. Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim 12 Plaintiff also once again claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when 13 he was attacked in his cell on November 17, 2019. ECF No. 9 at 8. He alleges he was a 14 Sensitive Needs Yard inmate in state prison, but the San Diego Sheriff’s Department 15 housed him in the general population which allowed the attack to occur. Id. Plaintiff was 16 instructed in the prior dismissal Order that such conclusory allegations in support of this 17 claim fail to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment violation, and he has not cured that 18 pleading defect in the SAC. See ECF No. 6 at 7, citing Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 19 of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and conclusory allegations of official 20 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient” to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 21 for relief.) 22 In addition, the only Defendant identified as violating the Eighth Amendment is, 23 once again, the San Diego Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff was instructed in the Court’s 24 prior dismissal Order that in order to sue a governmental unit or municipality, Plaintiff is 25 required to allege facts which show that a constitutional deprivation was caused by the 26 implementation or execution of “a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 27 officially adopted and promulgated” by the agency, or a “final decision maker.” See Monell 28 v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Board of the County 1 Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 402-04 (1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 2 714 (9th Cir. 1995). The SAC again fails to state a claim in this context because Plaintiff 3 has again failed to allege any facts which “might plausibly suggest” that the entity itself 4 violated his constitutional rights. See Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 5 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Iqbal’s pleading standards to Monell claims). Neither has he 6 identified any individual who he claims violated his constitutional rights in relation to the 7 assault. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides 8 for relief only against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by 9 affirmative acts, participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally 10 required duties, cause the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights). To 11 the extent Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for assault by the police at Patton State Hospital 12 the allegations in the SAC similarly fail to state a claim as they are also once again 13 conclusory and there are no individuals identified whom Plaintiff alleges are responsible. 14 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant San Diego Sheriff’s 15 Department is sua sponte dismissed without further leave to amend for failure to state a 16 claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 17 § 1915A(b). 18 D. New Claim/Defendant 19 Finally, the SAC presents a new claim against a new Defendant which was not 20 present in the other versions of the complaint. Plaintiff adds Defendant “Salinas Valley 21 State Prison Mailroom Employees,” and alleges they seized his property in May of 2024, 22 after this action was filed, in retaliation for filing a lawsuit. ECF No. 9 at 8. 23 Plaintiff was instructed in the Court’s prior dismissal Order that Federal Rule of 24 Civil Procedure 20 states that Defendants may be joined in one action if “any right to relief 25 is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 26 of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and “any 27 question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 28 20(a)(2)(A-B). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his assault and criminal proceedings 1 from 2019 through 2023 in San Diego County which is located in the Southern District of 2 California, and his alleged confiscation of personal property at Salinas Valley State Prison 3 in Soledad, California, in May of 2024 after this action was filed, which is located in the 4 Northern District of California, are not a set of “transactions or occurrences” which contain 5 a common question of law or facts. Plaintiff was instructed that if the requirements for 6 permissive joinder under Rule 20 are not satisfied, as they are not with this claim, the court 7 may sever under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 8 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff was instructed that under Rule 21, where a court finds 9 misjoinder, “on its own” it may “drop a party” or “sever any claim against a party.” 10 Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. He was warned that if he chose to amend his pleading and include claims 11 that are entirely unrelated, the claims may be severed from this action. Accordingly, the 12 Court severs Plaintiff’s new claim against new Defendant Salinas Valley State Prison 13 Mailroom Employees from this action and dismisses it without prejudice to Plaintiff to 14 attempt to proceed with this claim in the Northern District of California. 15 E. Leave to Amend 16 Because it is now absolutely clear that further amendment would be futile, the 17 dismissal of this action is without further leave to amend. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 18 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 19 leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that 20 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”), quoting Akhtar v. 21 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 22 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further 23 amendment would be futile); Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While 24 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) encourages leave to amend, district courts need not accommodate futile 25 amendments.”) 26 III. Conclusion and Orders 27 For the reasons explained, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Second Amended 28 Complaint without further leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief may 1 granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of Court 2 || will enter final judgment accordingly and close the case file. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: June 6, 2024 € Z 5 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9