People v. Reyes CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D083326 · 2024-10-24 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of San Diego County · No. SCE416866
Trial judge: Daniel G. Lamborn
Outcome: modified — Affirmed as modified.
Area: criminal
Panel: Michele M. Castillo (author), William S. Dato, Julia C. Kelety

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:02Z · confidence high

The trial court convicted the defendant of two DUI counts arising from the same act, sentenced him to two years on the first count, and stayed the second count without imposing a sentence as required by Penal Code section 654. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment as modified, exercising its inherent authority to impose the missing two-year middle term on the stayed count rather than remanding for resentencing.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Failure to impose a sentence on Count 2 before staying it under Penal Code section 654 “The trial court correctly found section 654 applied because “both charges relate to the same act of driving, so the term on one of the counts was required to be stayed.””	de novo	error	agree with court The appellate court correctly identified that Penal Code section 654 requires a trial court to impose a sentence on a stayed count before staying its execution. The court applied the correct standard of review (de novo for questions of law) and relied on binding authority (People v. Alford) to conclude that the trial court's failure to impose the sentence constituted an 'unauthorized absence of sentence.' The court's decision to modify the judgment rather than remand was supported by the clear record indicating the trial court intended to impose the middle term, aligning with the 'reasonable degree of certainty' standard for appellate modification of sentences.

Authorities

relied: People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463 — When a trial court determines that section 654 applies, it must impose sentence on that count and then stay execution of that sentence; failure to do so results in an unauthorized absence of sentence which can be corrected by the appellate court.
relied: People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307 — When facts are undisputed, the application of section 654 and questions of law are reviewed de novo.
relied: People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 — Appellate courts have inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence.
relied: People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776 — Remand for resentencing is appropriate when there are multiple counts and the trial court's discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence under section 654 cannot be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Supports the procedural mechanism for modifying a judgment to correct sentencing errors.
relied: People v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096 — Supports the finding that multiple DUI counts arising from the same act of driving are subject to section 654.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion is sound because it correctly applies the legal requirement that a sentence must be imposed before being stayed under section 654 and properly distinguishes the cited remand case (Washington) based on the clarity of the record regarding the intended sentence. The court's reliance on the 'reasonable degree of certainty' standard to modify the judgment rather than remand is well-supported by the trial court's explicit statements about imposing the middle term.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence medium

After a jury convicted Reyes of DUI (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving with a 0.08 percent or greater blood alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b)) arising from the same act of driving, the trial court imposed a two-year middle term on count 1 and stayed count 2 under Penal Code section 654 without imposing any sentence on it. The Court of Appeal, accepting the People's concession that the failure to impose a sentence before staying it was error, declined the People's request for remand and instead modified the judgment to impose a stayed two-year middle term on count 2, affirming as modified.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Trial court's finding that Penal Code section 654 applied to counts 1 and 2 because both arose from the same act of driving “The trial court correctly found section 654 applied because “both charges relate to the same act of driving, so the term on one of the counts was required to be stayed.””	de novo	correct	agree with court Both counts rest on a single act of driving, so section 654 bars multiple punishment; Toure and Corpening support de novo review of undisputed facts and the conclusion that one count must be stayed. Neither party disputed this point.
Trial court's stay of count 2 under section 654 without first imposing a sentence on that count “Here, the trial court should have—but did not—impose a sentence for count 2 before staying it.”	de novo	error (procedure)	agree with court Alford holds that when section 654 applies the court must impose sentence and then stay execution; omitting the sentence creates an unauthorized absence of sentence correctable on appeal. The appellate court properly treated this as error and, given the trial court's express rejection of the lower term and choice of the middle term on identical conduct, reasonably inferred the middle term for count 2 and exercised its inherent authority to modify rather than remand, distinguishing Washington where multiple discretionary sentencing choices remained.

Authorities

relied: People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463 — When section 654 applies, the trial court must impose sentence on the count and then stay execution; failing to impose a sentence is an unauthorized absence of sentence that the appellate court may correct by modification when the record shows what sentence the trial court would have imposed.
relied: People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307 — Application of section 654 to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo.
relied: People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 — Appellate courts have inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence.
relied: People v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096 — Section 654 requires a stay of one count where DUI counts relate to the same act of driving.
relied: People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776 — Remand for resentencing is appropriate where the trial court failed to apply section 654 to numerous counts and multiple discretionary choices remain; distinguished here because only one stayed count with an evident term remained.
relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Authorizes disposition of a straightforward appeal by memorandum opinion.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly identifies the Alford rule that a section 654 stay requires an imposed sentence, applies de novo review per Corpening, and sensibly distinguishes Washington to justify modification over remand based on the trial court's explicit middle-term reasoning on identical conduct. The analysis is brief but addresses the only contested issue (remedy) with apposite authority and a sufficient record basis.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 10/24/24 P. v. Reyes CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083326

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE416866)

MIGUEL ANGEL REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Daniel G. Lamborn, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Jennifer M. French, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Miguel Angel Reyes of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1) and of driving while having a measurable blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more (§ 23152(b); count 2), and for each count found Reyes had a measurable blood alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent or more. The two counts arose from the same act, so the trial court sentenced Reyes to a two-year prison term for count 1 and stayed count 2 without imposing a sentence. On appeal, Reyes contends, and the People concede, the trial court erred by not imposing a sentence on count 2 before staying it as required under Penal Code section 654. The parties, however, disagree on the appropriate remedy. Reyes asks us to impose the missing sentence for count 2, while the People ask us to remand to the trial court for resentencing. We agree with Reyes that remand is not necessary here. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to impose the middle term of two years on count 2, which remains stayed under section 654, and otherwise affirm the judgment by memorandum opinion. (See People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.) Penal Code section 654 applies to defendants convicted of multiple counts arising out of the same act, ensuring they are not punished multiple times for one act. (§ 654, subd. (a).) “[W]hen a trial court determines that section 654 applies to a particular count, the trial court must impose sentence on that count and then stay execution of that sentence.” (People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1466.) When, as here, the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the application of section 654 and questions of law. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 312.) Here, the trial court should have—but did not—impose a sentence for count 2 before staying it. The trial court correctly found section 654 applied because “both charges relate to the same act of driving, so the term on one of the counts was required to be stayed.” (People v. Toure (2015)

2 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1106.) But after the trial court imposed a sentence on count 1, it stayed count 2 without imposing a sentence. The People concede, and we agree, the trial court should have imposed a sentence on both counts before staying execution of the sentence on count 2. (Alford, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1466.) Where the parties disagree is on the remedy. We agree with Reyes that we may modify the judgment to impose the missing sentence rather than remand it to the trial court for resentencing as the People request. When the trial court did not impose a sentence on count 2 before staying it, it resulted “in an unauthorized absence of sentence.” (Alford, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472.) “[W]e could remand for a new sentencing hearing.” (Id. at p. 1473.) But we also have “inherent authority to correct an unauthorized sentence.” (People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1198.) The People contend “this case needs to be remanded to the trial court for resentencing,” citing People v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, but Washington is distinguishable. There, the defendant was sentenced on numerous counts of drug and firearm possession arising out of the same act. (Id. at p. 781.) None were stayed under section 654, which made the sentence unauthorized. (Ibid.) Washington remanded for resentencing because, given the number of counts involved and the absence of the trial court’s decision on which to stay execution of, there were multiple ways the trial court could exercise its “discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence in accordance with section 654’s directives.” (Id. at p. 799.) On the record here, in contrast, we can determine with a reasonable degree of certainty what sentence the trial court would impose for count 2, which makes remand unnecessary. At sentencing, the trial court made it known that “this is certainly not a lower-term case.” After considering 3 aggravating and mitigating factors, the court decided to “impose the middle term on this matter.” The court chose to punish Reyes on count 1 and to stay count 2 under section 654. As a result, all that is left is to impose the sentence for stayed count 2. Because both counts “involved essentially the same conduct” of driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, we can infer with a reasonable degree of certainty that the trial court would have imposed the two-year middle term on count 2 as well. (See Alford, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.) That record, along with the “futility and expense” of a resentencing hearing “that will not change [Reyes’] actual prison time” because count 2’s sentence remains stayed, prompts us to exercise our authority to modify the judgment. (Ibid.) Thus, we impose the two-year middle term on count 2. DISPOSITION We modify the judgment to impose the middle term of two years on count 2, which remains stayed under Penal Code section 654. The trial court is directed to prepare and forward an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. We affirm the judgment as modified.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

Cites, in this corpus

People v. Corpening S228258 · 2016-12-29
People v. Relkin C078628 · 2016-12-22
People v. Toure E058915 · 2015-01-05
People v. Alford C060251 · 2010-01-13
People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17