gno.law

In re T.M.P. CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D083564 · 2024-10-03 · Unpublished

Proceeding
appeal from an order
Trial court
Superior Court of San Diego County · No. J244320
Trial judge
Robert J. Trentacosta
Outcome
affirmed — Affirmed.
Area
delinquency
Panel
Joan K. Irion (author), Judith D. McConnell, Michele M. Castillo

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:04Z · confidence low

The juvenile court ordered the minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution for vehicle repairs and the cost of a replacement dog. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order, finding no arguable issues on independent review under Wende/Anders.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Order requiring Minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution
“The juvenile court found the victim to be credible and the requested amounts reasonable, and ordered Minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution.”
abuse of discretionnot reachedunsure
The court affirmed the restitution order without explicitly analyzing the abuse of discretion standard or the specific components of the award (vehicle vs. dog), relying instead on the Wende/Anders framework to find no arguable issues.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — Requires independent review of the record by the appellate court when appointed counsel files a Wende brief.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Requires independent review of the record by the appellate court when appointed counsel files an Anders brief.
  • relied: People v. Marrero (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 896 — Trial court has broad discretion in setting restitution and the order must be affirmed if there is a factual and rational basis.
  • relied: People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 — Standard for reviewing restitution orders is abuse of discretion.
  • relied: People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 — Allows a court to consider crimes that were charged but later dismissed when ordering restitution.
  • relied: People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67 — Supports the proposition that a court may consider dismissed charges when ordering restitution.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion is procedurally sound in its application of Wende/Anders, but it fails to provide the substantive legal analysis required to affirm a restitution order that includes the cost of a replacement animal, which is not explicitly covered by the statutory language quoted regarding 'stolen or damaged property.'

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The juvenile court, after T.M.P. admitted felony animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)) with a Harvey waiver on dismissed vandalism and dog-theft counts, ordered her to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution covering $970.50 in vehicle window repairs and $1,500 for a replacement dog. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Wende/Anders brief, the minor filed nothing, and the Court of Appeal independently reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and affirmed the restitution order.

Ruling reviewedStandardThe courtThe model
Victim restitution order of $2,470.50 under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, comprising $970.50 for car window parts and installation and $1,500 for a replacement dog
“The juvenile court found the victim to be credible and the requested amounts reasonable, and ordered Minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution.”
abuse of discretioncorrectagree with court
Section 730.6, subdivision (h)(1) requires full restitution for economic loss including replacement cost of like property or actual repair cost; the victim testified with receipts to specific repair expenditures, and the Harvey waiver permitted the court to consider losses from the dismissed vandalism count (People v. Baumann). The $1,500 replacement-dog figure is supported by the victim's testimony and a credibility finding; under the deferential 'rational method' standard (Marrero), a factual and rational basis exists. The only conceivable question—whether a purebred micro bully is 'like property' to the deceased pit bull—was not contested below and would not establish an arbitrary or capricious order on this record.

Authorities

  • relied: People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 — When appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues, the reviewing court must independently review the entire record for error.
  • relied: Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 — Appointed counsel who finds an appeal lacks merit must file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
  • relied: People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 — Absent a waiver, a court may not consider facts underlying dismissed counts at sentencing; a Harvey waiver permits such consideration.
  • relied: People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67 — In ordering restitution a court may consider crimes that were charged but later dismissed.
  • relied: People v. Marrero (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 896 — Trial court has broad discretion to set restitution by any rational method reasonably calculated to make the victim whole; order affirmed if it has a factual and rational basis.
  • relied: People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 — Restitution orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion; identified by counsel as the potential issue under Anders.

The appellate opinion: sound — The court correctly applied the Wende/Anders procedure, stated the governing constitutional and statutory restitution framework and the deferential standard of review, and the record facts recited (receipts, testimony, credibility finding, Harvey waiver) support the conclusion that no arguable issue exists. Because it is a no-issue Wende affirmance, the analysis is necessarily brief and does not expressly discuss whether a purebred replacement dog is 'like property,' but that omission does not undermine the result.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

Filed 10/3/24 In re T.M.P. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re T.M.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D083564 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J244320) v. T.M.P., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Robert J. Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed. Lisa A. Kopelman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

This appeal arises from a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 602 juvenile delinquency proceeding in which T.M.P. (Minor) admitted to 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. dragging the victim’s dog on a freeway in violation of Penal Code section 597, subdivision (b) (felony animal cruelty). Minor appeals from the juvenile court’s January 8, 2024 order requiring Minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution. Minor’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), indicating counsel has been unable to identify any arguable issues supporting reversal on appeal and asking this court to independently review the record for error. We offered Minor the opportunity to file her own brief on appeal, but she has not responded. We find no arguable issues and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 3, 2021, a long-standing feud between Minor and victim’s daughter escalated over statements about Minor’s deceased father. Minor came to victim’s home with some friends, broke the windows of the victim’s car with a baseball bat, engaged in a physical altercation with victim’s daughter, and drove away with the victim’s pet pit bull Luna. After posting images with Luna on social media, Minor dragged the dog along a freeway. Luna was later found dead. The People charged Minor with three felonies: vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), theft of another’s dog (Pen. Code, § 487e), and animal cruelty for dragging the victim’s dog on a freeway (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b)). At a readiness hearing after her arraignment, Minor admitted the 2 truth of the People’s felony animal cruelty charge, and the juvenile court dismissed the remaining charges with a Harvey2 waiver. At the February 10, 2023 disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged Minor a ward of the court under section 602, issued probation orders, and ordered restitution to be paid in an amount to be determined. The juvenile court held a restitution hearing on January 8, 2024. The victim testified she paid a total of $970.50 to repair her vehicle. She paid $90 for two glass windows from Atlas Auto Recycling (Exhibit 1); $130.50 for two quarter glass windows from LKQ (Exhibit 2); $150 for the back window paid through a Zelle account (Exhibit 3), and $300 for the front windshield from Bernie’s Automotive Glass (Exhibit 4). She also paid a friend $300 through Cash App to install the windows. The victim also testified she purchased a new dog, a purebred micro bully named Beloved, for $1,500. The juvenile court found the victim to be credible and the requested amounts reasonable, and ordered Minor to pay $2,470.50 in victim restitution. Minor filed a timely appeal from the restitution order. DISCUSSION The California Constitution requires every victim be compensated for losses incurred as a result of a defendant’s crime. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13).) Absent “compelling and extraordinary reasons,” the court must order restitution “of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of 2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758. When ordering restitution, a court may consider crimes which were charged but later dismissed. (People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 78.)

3 the minor’s conduct . . . , including . . . [f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (h)(1).) “ ‘ “[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion in setting the amount of restitution; it may ‘ “use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution which is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole . . . . ” ’ [Citation.] . . . “In determining the amount of restitution, all that is required is that the trial court ‘use a rational method that could reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and may not make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.’ [Citations.] The order must be affirmed if there is a factual and rational basis for the amount.” ’ ” (People v. Marrero (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 896, 906.) As we have noted, appellate counsel has submitted a Wende brief and asks the court to review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance with Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, counsel has identified the following issue that was considered in evaluating the potential merits of this appeal: “Did the court abuse its discretion in making the restitution order[?] (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57.)” We have reviewed the record for error as required by Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738. We have not discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel represented Minor in this appeal.

4 DISPOSITION The restitution order is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

Cites, in this corpus