People v. Nava CA4/1
- Proceeding
- appeal from a judgment
- Trial court
- Superior Court of Riverside County · No. SWF2100597
- Trial judge
- Stephen J. Gallon
- Outcome
- vacated — Vacated and remanded with directions.
- Area
- criminal
- Panel
- Michele M. Castillo (author), William S. Dato, Truc T. Do
Analysis
The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive prison terms for grand theft of a firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, finding that the consecutive sentences violated Penal Code section 654 because both crimes stemmed from a single physical act.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of consecutive prison terms for grand theft of a firearm and possession of a firearm as a felon“we agree that imposing consecutive sentences for both the grand theft and firearm possession offenses violates section 654 by punishing Nava more than once for different crimes resulting from a single act.” | de novo | error | agree with court agree with court |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Standard for remand and resentencing when a sentencing error is found.
- relied: People v. Atencio (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1239 — Acquiring a firearm through theft and possessing it constitutes a single act for purposes of Penal Code section 654.
- relied: People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307 — Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment for multiple violations arising from a single physical act.
- relied: People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 — The trial court has discretion to select which count is punishable when section 654 applies.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the single-act test from People v. Atencio to the specific facts of grand theft and subsequent possession of the same firearm. It appropriately cites People v. Mendoza to support the procedural mechanism of remanding for the trial court to exercise its discretion in selecting the punishable count.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionThe trial court sentenced Nava to consecutive prison terms of six years for grand theft of a firearm and one year four months for being a felon in possession of the same firearm, both arising from his taking of the gun on a single day. On appeal, with the People conceding error, the Court of Appeal held the consecutive terms violated Penal Code section 654, vacated the sentence, and remanded for full resentencing so the trial court could choose which count to punish.
| Ruling reviewed | Standard | The court | The model |
|---|---|---|---|
Imposition of separate consecutive prison terms for grand theft of a firearm and felon in possession of the same firearm, rather than staying one term under Penal Code section 654.“Because the means by which Nava took the firearm was also the means by which he gained possession of it, he committed only one criminal act.” | unclear | error (law misapplied) | agree with court Section 654 bars multiple punishment for a single physical act, and Atencio addressed the identical pairing of offenses (theft of a firearm and felon in possession of that firearm acquired by the theft) and held they constitute one act. The People conceded the point, and the opinion properly applies Corpening's single-act framework. Remand rather than a simple stay is correct because post-Assembly Bill 518 section 654 gives the trial court discretion to select which count to punish, as Mendoza recognizes. |
Authorities
- relied: People v. Atencio (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1239 — Theft of a firearm and felon in possession of the same firearm, where possession arises from the theft, constitute a single act for which section 654 bars multiple punishment.
- relied: People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307 — Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment where a single physical act accomplishes more than one offense.
- relied: People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843 — Under amended section 654, the trial court has discretion to select which of the applicable provisions to punish, so remand is appropriate for the court to exercise that discretion in the first instance.
- relied: People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847 — Appellate courts may resolve matters by memorandum opinion where the issue is settled and the parties agree.
The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion applies directly on-point authority (Atencio) involving the same two offenses, invokes Corpening's single-act rule, and correctly remands for the trial court to exercise its post-AB 518 discretion under Mendoza. It is brief but the issue was conceded and the authorities fully support the result.
Opinion
Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Nava CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084021
Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2100597)
JUAN CARLOS NAVA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Stephen J. Gallon, Judge. Vacated and remanded with directions. Robert V. Vallandigham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Sulaiman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Juan Carlos Nava of grand theft of a firearm and possession of the same firearm as a felon. At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed consecutive prison terms of six years for the grand theft and one year and four months for the firearm possession offense. Nava contends, and the People agree, that the trial court violated Penal Code section 654 by imposing separate prison terms for two crimes stemming from the same underlying act. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion, we agree and vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing to redress the error. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.) Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” In other words, this section forbids “‘punishment for multiple violations of the Penal Code . . . for a single physical act.’” (People v. Atencio (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1243 (Atencio).) Here, Nava was charged separately with offenses premised on both (1) the manner in which he acquired a firearm and (2) possessing, later the same day, the same firearm. Because the means by which Nava took the firearm was also the means by which he gained possession of it, he committed only one criminal act. (See Atencio, 208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1245.) Finding persuasive the reasoning of Atencio—which analyzed the same issue as to the same offenses, and on which both parties rely—we agree that imposing consecutive sentences for both the grand theft and firearm possession offenses violates section 654 by punishing Nava more than once for different crimes resulting from a single act. (See People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) Because section 654 gives the trial court the 2 discretion to select either count as the punishable offense, we vacate the sentence and remand for the trial court to exercise that discretion in the first instance. (People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 843, 862.) DISPOSITION We vacate the sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for a full resentencing consistent with this opinion.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
Cites, in this corpus
- People v. Corpening S228258 · 2016-12-29
- People v. Atencio No. C063710 · 2012-08-28
- People v. Garcia F034831 · 2002-04-17